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1 Introduction 
The low labour market attachment of the elderly has far-reaching consequences for the 
sustainability of the public welfare system in general and the pension system in particular, as 
well as important implications for future labour supply in ageing societies. Despite increasing 
longevity, the average effective age at which older workers withdraw from the labour force 
has declined in almost all OECD countries since the 1970s (OECD, 2009). Even though this 
trend has been slightly reversed since the turn of the millennium, the effective retirement ages 
in all but two OECD countries remain substantially lower than in the 1960s and 1970s. For 
Germany, Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2011) report that the labour force participation of elderly 
men aged 60 to 64 has dropped from more than 80% in 1966 to less than 35% in 1980s and 
1990s. Since about the year 2000, the participation rate has been increasing again, arguably as 
a response to a sequence of cost cutting reforms after 1992, but it was still just over 40% in 
2005. Also female labour force participation in this age group has dropped sharply in the 
1970s and only started to recover in the mid-1990s, reaching approximately 25% in 2005.    
Germany introduced partial and gradual retirement options in 1996 under the name of 
part-time work for elderly employees (henceforth PWE). It was intended as a means to 
smooth the transition from work life to retirement for individuals of age 55 and older.1 
Employees and employers were given the choice between a part-time work schedule during 
the entire PWE period, and a full-time work schedule in the first half and a leave of absence in 
the second half of the PWE period, which is called the block model.  
Over the entire PWE period, the employers were obliged to pay 50% of the gross 
wage. However, if the employer filled the vacancies created by PWE with unemployed or 
young job seekers, Germany's Federal Employment Agency (FEA) provided a supplement 
                                                          
1  Indeed, multiple surveys that have been conducted in various countries suggest that workers have an interest 
in reducing their working hours as they get older, see for instance Abraham and Houseman (2004) and 
Drago, Wooden, and Black (2009). 
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payment such that employees in PWE effectively received 70% of their prior net salary and 
90% of their pension contribution. The aim of PWE was to decrease costs in the public pen-
sion and unemployment schemes through an increase in the labour force attachment of elderly 
workers that would have otherwise withdrawn from work life completely via unemployment 
and/or early retirement. The political discussion of PWE has been highly controversial, de-
spite a legal revision in 2004 that reduced the generosity of supplement payments. Critics ar-
gue that the block model, which accounts for the vast majority of PWE agreements, has a 
similar character as "regular" early retirement schemes (see the discussion in Brussig, Knuth, 
and Wojtkowski, 2009) and that PWE, in contrast to its initial intention, creates unjustifiable 
public costs through the supplement payments of the FEA.  
Motivated by the challenges of the negative effects of low labour market attachment of 
elderly workers in ageing societies and the ambiguity of the merits of PWE in the political 
discussion, this paper investigates the effects of the availability of PWE in German firms on 
the labour market outcomes of their employees. Most of the existing literature has focused on 
studying the determinants of partial retirement (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984; Honig 
and Hanoch, 1985; Ruhm, 1990; Hurd and McGarry, 1993; Haider and Loughran, 2001; 
Hutchens, 2003; Even and Macpherson, 2004; Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006; Hutchens 
and Chen, 2007; Robinson and Clark, 2010).  Comparably few studies investigate the effect 
of these schemes on the age at which workers completely withdraw from the labour market. 
Using the 2006 Portuguese Labour Force Survey and a hazard model, Machado and Portela 
(2012), for example, investigate the effect of a voluntary reduction in hours of work on the 
timing of full retirement. The authors find that reductions are associated with earlier retire-
ment in their data and conclude that reducing hours of work appears to signal the desire to 
retire sooner rather than to remain in the labour market (at reduced hours). 
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This paper contributes to the existing literature in several dimensions. Firstly, we not 
only investigate how the availability of PWE affects labour market participation, but also con-
sider other outcomes of interest. We study the effects on employment and tenure as alternative 
measures of labour market attachment and worker retention. Additionally, we investigate the 
effects on unemployment as alternative pathways to (early) retirement, which may be substi-
tuted for PWE. Our findings can therefore serve as inputs to a cost-benefit analysis of PWE in 
terms of public costs. Secondly, we analyse effect heterogeneity with respect to regions with 
different labour market conditions and gender.  
Finally, relative to the existing literature, we also make some methodological im-
provements. We exploit unique linked employer-employee data that combine high-quality 
survey and administrative data. These data allow us to follow individual labour market out-
comes for up to 6.5 years, such that both short and longer-term effects can be assessed. We 
explicitly address the selection problems involved in the estimation of the effects of PWE on 
workers’ labour market outcomes. The richness of the data allows us to plausibly control for 
employers' selection into offering PWE. Moreover, in addition to conditioning on a compre-
hensive set of observed characteristics, we use an empirical design that also controls for unob-
served time-constant confounders. Also in contrast to much of the literature, we use rather 
flexible econometric methods, namely semiparametric radius matching on the propensity 
score with bias adjustment as proposed in Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2011) and analyzed 
in terms of finite sample properties in Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013). Contrary to para-
metric estimators, these robust methods have the advantage that they do not rely on tight 
functional form assumptions that are likely to be violated in real world applications, and they 
allow for effect heterogeneity. 
We find that PWE does not affect the time at which elderly workers withdraw from 
the labour market. Instead, the availability of PWE reduces unemployment on the way to-
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wards (early) retirement. For East Germany, in contrast to West Germany, we find positive 
effects on employment and tenure as measures of labour market attachment and worker reten-
tion by firms. These findings suggest that partial or gradual retirement options offered by 
firms can be an important tool to alleviate the negative effects of low labour market attach-
ment of elderly workers in ageing societies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background in-
formation on PWE in Germany. In Section 3, we introduce the database and define the sample 
used in the estimation. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics. Identification and estimation 
are outlined in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the effect estimates for the various groups de-
fined by age, gender, and region. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A provides the specifications 
and results of the estimations of the various propensity scores. 
2 Background information on part-time employment for elderly in Germany 
2.1 Institutional background 
In 1996, the “Altersteilzeitgesetz” (henceforth PWE Act), which provided a legal 
framework for partial or gradual retirement agreements, came into force in Germany. Em-
ployers and employees could choose between two options (see German Federal Employment 
Agency 2003): a part-time work schedule during the entire PWE period, and the so-called 
block model that comprises a full-time work schedule in the first half and a leave of absence 
in the second half. Over the entire PWE period, employers were required to pay 50% of the 
gross wage. If the vacancies created by PWE were filled with unemployed or young job seek-
ers, Germany's Federal Employment Agency (FEA) provided a supplement payment such that 
employees in PWE effectively received 70% of their prior net salary and 90% of their pension 
contribution. Smaller companies with up to 50 employees were also allowed to hire appren-
tices instead of unemployed and/or young job seekers. To be eligible for the supplement, 
which was granted for at most 6 years (even if the PWE agreement covered a longer period), 
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employees had to be 55 or older and had to work for at least 18 hours per week after reducing 
their working time by half. In 2000, eligibility was extended to individuals in part-time em-
ployment (even before switching into PWE). 
It is important to note that the PWE Act did not create a general legal claim to PWE 
for all employees in Germany. The adoption of PWE was conditional on the employer’s deci-
sion to offer these options and formally required the consideration in the collective wage 
agreement (if applicable) or some form of internal agreement, see Brussig, Knuth, and 
Wojtkowski (2009). Furthermore, the PWE Act only set the legal minimum standards (that 
were subject to potential supplement payments by the FEA), but several collective wage 
agreements provided higher wages, see Wanger (2009). Descriptive statistics in Ellguth and 
Koller (2000) suggest that (in 1998) larger firms were considerably more likely to offer PWE 
than smaller ones, which the authors suspect to result from the higher flexibility of the former 
in terms of human resource policies as well as the involvement of employee organiza-
tions/works committees.   
In 2004, the PWE regulations were revised in the course of the so-called Hartz III leg-
islation that reduced the generosity of the FEA-sponsored components (see German Federal 
Employment Agency, 2008). Firstly, for all PWE agreements starting on July 1, 2004 or later, 
a 20% wage supplement to the PWE gross salary (50% of the prior full time gross salary) was 
granted, however, excluding single or irregular payments. This could generally entail a net 
salary lower than 70% of the prior full time net salary. Secondly, the pension contributions 
were reduced. Thirdly, for the block model, employers were obliged to insure against loss in 
case of bankruptcy. Finally, by the beginning of 2010, the entitlement to FEA supplements for 
new PWE agreements expired altogether implying that no new supplement payments were 
granted from 2010. However, the PWE Act remains a valid legal framework for employers 
and employees, even if FEA sponsoring does no longer apply to new agreements. 
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2.2 Utilization of PWE  
As shown in Figure 2.1, the utilization of PWE increased steadily in the 10 years after 
its introduction in 1996, reaching an annual average stock of almost 530,000 elderly workers 
in 2006. In the subsequent two years, PWE utilization remained quite stable. According to 
Brussig, Knuth, and Wojtkowski (2009), almost one in five employees aged 55 to 64 was in 
PWE in 2007 when considering total employment subject to obligatory social security contri-
butions in this age group. In 2009, PWE experienced a sharp rise to more than 672,000 work-
ers, very likely as a reaction to the economic crisis. Disentangling the stock by gender and 
region shows that males in West Germany accounted for 48%, females in West Germany for 
31%, males in East Germany for 8%, and females in East Germany for 13% of PWE in 2009 
according to the German Pension Insurance Fund (2012).  
Figure 2.1: Annual average stock of total and FEA-sponsored PWE 
 
Sources: Statistics of the German Pension Insurance Fund (http://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de, 2012) 
and of the German Federal Employment Agency (http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de, 2012).  
Interestingly, only a minor part of total PWE in any given period was supported by the 
FEA. This suggests that many employers, albeit adopting PWE, preferred foregoing the FEA 
supplement payments at the benefit of remaining unconstraint in their hiring policies. After a 
continuous rise it passed 100,000 beneficiaries in 2006 and has been declining slowly ever 
since 2008. Note that the statistic only considers cases that received FEA transfers in the re-
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spective year, irrespective of the total time frame of the PWE agreement. For the block model, 
this implies that the individuals only enter these statistics during their leave of absence, i.e., in 
the second half of the PWE, as FEA payments only start after the full-time work phase. Dis-
entangling the shares of the two PWE models, namely part-time work over the entire time 
frame versus the block model, reveals that the latter is by far the more popular option and has 
become more important over time. Already in 2005, 84.6% of all FEA-sponsored PWE 
agreements were based on the block model, and its share increased to 89.1% (90.2%) in 2008 
(2011) (see German Federal Employment Agency, 2012).  
The predominance of the block model seems to be contrary to the initial political de-
sire to truly smooth the work-retirement transition rather than having separate periods of full 
and no employment. Wanger (2009) notes that it was the employer and employee organiza-
tions that demanded the consideration of the block model in the PWE Act, as it arguably pro-
vided employers with a socially acceptable means to rejuvenate the workforce and enabled 
employees to de facto retire without large financial losses. The usage of the block model as a 
tool to reshape the firms’ staff could therefore be an important reason for the popularity of 
PWE, also in the light of the low take-up of FEA supplements which apparently were not the 
driving force in this development.       
The costs of FEA-sponsoring were nevertheless far from being negligible. Figure 2.2 
shows that expenditures raised dramatically since the PWE Act came into force, therefore 
causing much controversy in political and public debates in Germany. They climbed from just 
10.6 million Euros in 1997 for 3,286 cases to a staggering 1.38 billion in 2007 when FEA-
sponsored PWE reached its peak (104,350 cases).  In 2010, PWE still accounted for 1.34 bil-
lion or roughly 3% of the FEA's total expenditures.  
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Figure 2.2: Annual PWE-related expenditures of the Federal Employment Agency  
 
Sources: Statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency (http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de, 2012)..  
3 Data and definition of the sample 
3.1  Data  
Our empirical analysis relies on unique linked employer-employee data that combine 
different administrative and survey data sets from the FEA's Institute of Employment Re-
search (IAB). The data is based on the IAB Establishment Panel, which is a representative 
survey of German establishments. It covers a broad spectrum of firm level information in-
cluding firm size, industry, legal form, biographical data, structure of the work force (e.g. 
education, occupation, share of males/females), employee turnover, vacancies and labour de-
mand, working hours, and human resource policies (e.g. flexible work time, inclination to 
recruit older workers). Furthermore, there is information on training activities, financial reve-
nues and profits, investment activities, usage rate, technological and organizational factors, 
and use of financial support or subsidies, among many others. The survey was first conducted 
in 1993 and is annually repeated. It is an unbalanced panel due to attrition and the inclusion of 
new companies over time.  
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The information from the EP has been linked to the so-called IAB Establishment His-
tory Panel that includes a rich set of aggregate information on the firm’s employees. The vari-
ables describe the composition of a firm’s work force, for example in terms of age, education, 
tenure, and earnings. They are based on the employees’ social insurance records and are con-
structed, for each year, from the cross section of all workers employed in the firm on June 30. 
For the firms in our sample, which is described in more detail below, the social insur-
ance records of their employees with full employment, unemployment and earnings histories 
and a rich set of personal characteristics for the years 1990-2008 have been merged to the 
firm data. These data have been used, for example, by Wunsch and Lechner (2008), Biewen et 
al. (2013), Wunsch (2013), and Lechner and Wunsch (2013). Finally, the data also contains a 
rich set of regional characteristics such as the federal state, urbanization, and local labour 
market conditions that have been linked via county identifiers from regional statistics.  
3.2  Sample and treatment definition 
Our empirical analysis is based on the 13,931 firms included in the IAB Establishment 
Panel in 2000. As described in more detail below, the design of our study requires that we 
also observe the firms in the 1999 and 2002 waves of the survey. Due to relatively high attri-
tion rates in the EP,2 this reduces the original firm sample by 57%. We furthermore exclude 
all firms with less than 100 or more than 1000 employees in the year 2000 (which reduces the 
sample size by another 28%) to increase homogeneity and, more importantly, to avoid com-
mon support problems. The latter arise if for some firms that offer PWE no comparable (in 
terms of observed characteristics) firms that do not offer PWE can be found. In particular, 
small firms are rarely offering PWE and, therefore, a size of less than 100 employees would 
almost perfectly predict selection into treatment. Furthermore, firms that neither have a col-
lective wage agreement, nor tie pay to collective agreements were discarded due to similar 
                                                          
2  See http://fdz.iab.de/de/FDZ_Establishment_Data/IAB_Establishment_Panel/IAB_Establishment_Panel_ 
Working_Tools.aspx#Weitere%20Arbeitshilfen, 03.09.2013. 
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common support issues. For similar reasons, we exclude firms in specific sectors, in particular 
agriculture, forestry, mining, power/water supply, children's/retirement homes, laun-
dry/cleaning services, grooming, rental activities (e.g. cars), public administration, and social 
insurance. Firm that could not be attributed to any industry are deleted as well. Thus, the 
sample is restricted to private companies that are representative for firms in the manufacturing 
and service sectors. The reduction in sample size due to these last selection steps is small.  
Information about PWE comes from two sources. Firstly, the 1999 and 2002 waves of 
the firm survey include a question whether the firms offers PWE. Secondly, the social insur-
ance records of the employees indicate whether there is any worker on a PWE contract. For 
identification, we will exploit the introduction of PWE in some firms between 2000 and 2002. 
Therefore, our baseline sample consists of firms that do not offer PWE in 1999 and 2000 
(measured in the 1999 survey and the administrative data from 1999 and 2000), which is the 
case for 80% of the firms that remained after the selection steps explained in the last para-
graph. Treatment status is defined based on the availability of PWE in 2002: The treated pool 
consists of all firms that have switched to offering PWE according to the survey data, while 
those not offering PWE in 2002 according to both the survey data and to the administrative 
data constitute the nontreated sample. The very few cases where PWE is offered according to 
the administrative data but not according to the survey data are discarded from our sample.  
In our analysis, we focus on the effects of offering PWE on the firms’ work force in 
the year 2000. Thus, our estimation sample consists of the workers who are employed by the 
sampled firms in June 2000 with at least three years of tenure. The conditions prevents that 
identification is jeopardized, for example, by employees entering a firm in reaction to the (ex-
pected) introduction of PWE. Furthermore, we select only workers of age 31 to 60 years (June 
2000). This condition ensures that workers are sufficiently away from educational choices and 
statutory retirement age (65).  
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Table 3.1: Number of firms and individuals per stratum 
 
West East 
 
Males  Females  Males  Females  
Age 31-40 41-50  51-60 31-40 41-50  51-60 31-40 41-50  51 plus 31-40 41-50  51-60 
Firms 179 178 176 178 178 174 166 167 171 172 201 182 
Individuals  4098 4269 3390 3323 3412 2227 4145 4894 2902 4339 4953 2454 
 
We conduct our evaluation within 12 distinct strata. They are defined by region (West 
and East Germany) to account for differences in selection into treatment, as well as age 
groups (elderly: 51-60, intermediate: 41-50, and young: 31-40) and gender, to account for the 
possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects and, as regards the youngest group, to assess the 
validity of our identification strategy (see the last paragraph of Section 5.2 for details). Table 
3.1 summarizes the number of observations (firms and individuals) that are available in each 
of the 12 strata.  
4. Descriptive statistics  
This section presents descriptive statistics for the key group of elderly workers (aged 
51-60) and their employers. In Table 4.1, we present characteristics of the firms in which the 
elderly workers were employed in June 2000, separately by PWE status, gender, and region. 
Table 4.2 displays the characteristics of employees in those groups.3  
                                                          
3  Information on the younger groups that are also considered in the econometric analysis (aged 41-50 and 31-
40, respectively) is available from the authors upon request. Also, due to the very large number of variables 
in the data (several hundred) we abstain from presenting statistics on all variables. They are available on re-
quest. The information available in administrative data is well documented in Wunsch and Lechner (2008) 
and Lechner and Wunsch (2013). For a detailed documentation of the variables available in the IAB Estab-
lishment Panel see http://fdz.iab.de/de/FDZ_Establishment_Data/IAB_Establishment_Panel/IAB_ 
Establishment_Panel_Working_Tools.aspx, for those in the IAB Establishment History Panel see 
http://fdz.iab.de/de/FDZ_Establishment_Data/Establishment_History_Panel/Establishment_History_Panel_
Working_Tools.aspx. 
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Table 4.1: Mean characteristics of firms of elderly workers, by gender and region 
 
Men West Women West Men East Women East 
 PWE no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Basic firm characteristics 
        Log number of employees 5.65 5.87 5.48 5.90 5.53 5.71 5.56 5.90 
Number of newly hired employees 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.12 
Number of employees leaving the firm 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.09 
Mean age of employees 40 40 40 39 41 40 41 39 
Share of employees being 55 or older 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 
Normalized mean earnings 1.22 1.34 0.93 1.12 0.94 1.09 0.75 0.91 
Share of female employees 0.26 0.21 0.55 0.51 0.34 0.26 0.65 0.66 
Share of employees w/o German citizenship 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Share of part-time employees  0.09 0.06 0.23 0.20 0.08 0.06 0.26 0.25 
Human capital 
        Share of apprentices 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 
Share of unskilled workers 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.09 
Share of skilled workers 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.13 0.41 0.45 0.22 0.17 
Share of clerks 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.34 0.42 
Share of employees without vocational degree 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.28 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 
Share of employees with vocational degree 0.61 0.64 0.48 0.61 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.76 
Share of college/university graduates 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.11 
Industry 
        Manufacturing 0.66 0.88 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.78 0.28 0.26 
Construction 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 
Trade/sales/retail 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.19 0.22 
Service industry 0.14 0.05 0.28 0.20 0.35 0.14 0.49 0.51 
Organization 
        Foreign ownership >50% 0.37 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.03 
No working-time accounts 0.21 0.25 0.39 0.36 0.25 0.19 0.44 0.50 
No works council 0.14 0.04 0.32 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.27 0.04 
Profit sharing 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.12 
Pay tied to collective agreement 0.24 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.13 
Recent reorganization of corporate structure 0.33 0.55 0.23 0.34 0.44 0.27 0.39 0.29 
Staff-related issues 
        Looking for staff right now 0.60 0.67 0.52 0.67 0.27 0.45 0.34 0.50 
Hard to find skilled workers 0.59 0.67 0.51 0.66 0.42 0.53 0.30 0.50 
Staff shortage 0.30 0.15 0.29 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 
High rate of absences 0.38 0.21 0.34 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.15 0.21 
Regional characteristics 
        Firm in city 0.38 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.30 
Deviation from mean unemployment rate ‘02 8.37 8.39 8.24 9.25 13.60 14.98 15.67 15.79 
Number of observations 1167 2223 951 1276 1365 1537 1307 1147 
Note: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000.  
Table 4.1 shows that the introduction of PWE is selective with respect to a range of 
firm characteristics. In particular, establishments providing PWE are on average substantially 
larger and pay higher wages than those that do not. Moreover, they differ considerably from 
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non-providers of PWE in terms of the distribution of industries. Organizational characteristics 
also seem to matter. Foreign-owned firms or companies that tie wages to a collective agree-
ment are less likely to offer PWE, while firms with a works council or profit sharing arrange-
ment are more likely to do so. The incidence of recent corporate reorganizations is also re-
lated to the treatment, however, in opposite directions for West and East Germany. A further 
important dimension concerns staff-related issues such as difficulties in hiring or retaining 
employees, because PWE could potentially be used to alleviate such problems. Indeed, the 
data suggest that firms reporting searching for employees and having trouble in finding 
skilled personnel are more likely to offer PWE, arguably to prevent experienced elderly em-
ployees from leaving the firm too early. 
Table 4.2: Mean characteristics of elderly workers, by gender and region  
 
Men West Women West Men East Women East 
 PWE no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Age 55.2 55.2 55.1 54.6 55.5 55.3 54.8 54.8 
No vocational degree 0.18 0.20 0.46 0.38 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.06 
Vocational degree 0.68 0.71 0.42 0.56 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.82 
College/university degree 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.23 0.07 0.08 
Tenure in years 3.49 3.34 3.24 3.39 2.66 2.82 2.64 2.79 
Share employed in 2 years before 2000 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.94 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.38 
Share unemployed in 2 years before 2000 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 
Share out of labour force in 2 years before 2000 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.62 0.51 0.58 0.59 
Gross earnings per month in 2000  3060 3240 1760 2080 2180 2480 1660 1920 
Unskilled worker 0.24 0.26 0.42 0.32 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.08 
Skilled worker 0.39 0.34 0.06 0.01 0.50 0.53 0.12 0.09 
Clerk 0.37 0.40 0.25 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.49 0.54 
Job in engineering 0.30 0.33 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.36 0.04 0.07 
Job in construction 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Job in manufacturing  0.15 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.06 0.06 
High-skilled job in services 0.27 0.24 0.37 0.49 0.28 0.22 0.55 0.69 
Low-skilled job in services 0.09 0.07 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.13 
Other job 0.10 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.04 
No German citizenship 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of observations 1167 2223 951 1276 1365 1537 1307 1147 
Note: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. 
Table 4.2 indicates that the firms offering PWE also differ in terms of the composition 
of their work force. Their employees appear to have on average somewhat more favourable 
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labour market histories. For example, the proportion of time in employment prior to the 
treatment period is higher (apart from West German men, who were fully employed in any 
case), while among West German women and East German men, the time out of labour force 
is lower. Furthermore, the average earnings of elderly employees in firms with PWE are 
somewhat higher, which is in line with the higher average earnings among firms with PWE in 
general. Finally, the composition of jobs differs substantially across elderly workers in firms 
with and without PWE, which appears intuitive given the differences in the distribution of 
industries mentioned before.  
5. Empirical strategy 
5.1 Identification  
Identification of the effect of PWE requires solving three selection problems. Firstly, 
workers self-select into PWE. Gustman and Steinmeier (1984), for example, find using the 
Retirement History Study (RHS) on men aged 58 to 63 provided by the US Social Security 
Administration, that partial retirement varies systematically with individual characteristics 
such as age, health, family status as well as pension coverage, mandatory retirement provi-
sions, and wage offers in the main and partial-retirement jobs. Similarly, Honig, and Hanoch 
(1985) use the same data source and identify health, age, education, expected social security 
income, nonwage income, self-employment, labour force experience, and pension coverage as 
key determinants of retirement, partial retirement, and full employment.4 More recently, 
Robinson and Clark (2010) combined the HRS with the Rand HRS database to estimate the 
effect of retiree health insurance on the retirement decision by means of a Cox proportional 
hazard model and propensity score matching. Insurance is found to increase the likelihood to 
                                                          
4  Furthermore, Kim and DeVaney (2005) estimate a multinomial logit based on the RHS. In line with previous 
findings, their results suggest that the more educated and self-employed more likely choose partial retirement 
over full-time work, while those with more financial assets, pensions, health insurance, poor health, and less 
education have an increased probability to fully retire. Also see Ruhm (1990) and Haider and Loughran 
(2001). 
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disengage from the job considerably. Many of these variables, especially health and pension 
coverage are unobserved in most data sets.  
We tackle the problem of self-selection of workers into PWE as follows: Firstly, we 
estimate a causal parameter similar to an intention-to-treat effect. Specifically, we estimate 
the effect of the availability of PWE in a firm rather than take-up of PWE by its employees. 
Thus, we do not have to model selection into take-up of PWE. Moreover, we consider this 
parameter the most interesting one as it gives the effect of introducing the PWE at the firm 
level. Secondly, we consider workers who are employed in firms that do not offer PWE ini-
tially, thus making them homogeneous ex ante, and then exploit the introduction of PWE by 
some but not by all of those firms. Thirdly, we require that all workers have been with the 
firm for at least three years by the time PWE is introduced to ensure that workers did not self-
select into firms in anticipation of the introduction of PWE. 
The second selection problem occurs because firms select into offering PWE. Hutch-
ens and Grace-Martin (2006) address this issue using the US Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) and conclude that phased retirement is more likely available in firms with flexible 
work hours, part-time employment, and job sharing.5 This is in line with Hurd and McGarry 
(1993), who find that particular job characteristics such as the flexibility to reduce hours or 
move to a less demanding job increase the prospective retirement age.6  Again using the HRS, 
Even and Macpherson (2004) consider both firm- and individual-level selection into partial 
retirement. Their results suggest that firms providing pension plans are less willing to allow 
workers to cut hours and that (in line with the studies mentioned before) pension-covered 
workers are less likely to switch to part-time employment and more likely to switch to full 
retirement. The latter is true even conditional on the original employer’s willingness to allow 
                                                          
5  See also Hutchens (2010), who uses the same survey to investigate which types of employees have particu-
larly good chances to be considered for phased retirement in firms offering it at all.   
6  Pensions and health care insurance are further important predictors of prospective retirement, in contrast to 
physical and mental job requirements.  
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a reduction in work hours and various firm and worker characteristics. Hutchens and Chen 
(2007) combine the HRS with a representative US employer survey conducted in 2001 and 
2002 and confirm previous findings that the opportunity of partial retirement depends on both 
employer and employee characteristics (e.g., whether the company is public or private, work-
er's age, defined benefit pension plans, and unionization). Furthermore, Hutchens (2003) finds 
that firm size and growth, as well as the composition of the work force in terms of age, gen-
der, and tenure is correlated with the likelihood to offer partial retirement. 
We base identification on the assumption that we observe all relevant determinants of 
the decision to introduce PWE that are also related to the labour market performance of the 
firms’ employees (so-called conditional independence assumption, CIA, see Imbens, 2004, 
and Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, for an in-depth discussion). The survey and administrative 
data together provide detailed information on job flexibility (e.g., part-time work, flexible 
working times, job rotation, etc.), unionization and the presence of collective agreements, 
industry, firm size, firm growth, and various dimensions of the work force structure such as 
education, occupation, gender, age and tenure, suggesting that we can control for most of the 
firm-level characteristics that have been identified as being crucial in the literature. Employer 
pension plans play a negligible role in Germany as most pensions are coming from the public 
pension insurance. However, we control for other financial incentives to stay with or leave a 
firm such as equity and profit participation. We additionally condition on important regional 
characteristics such as geographic region, urbanization, and local unemployment rate, which 
could affect the introduction of PWE via the composition of the local labour force or firm 
performance while at the same time influencing individual labour market success.  
The third selection problem occurs due to individual selection into the firms. Even if 
the firm and regional characteristics listed above are held constant, some characteristics of the 
firms’ workers that affect their labour market performance may still differ between firms with 
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and without PWE. We solve this problem by exploiting the rich set and longitudinal dimen-
sion of the employee-level characteristics provided in the administrative data. Besides char-
acteristics such as age, education, occupation, job position, and earnings, workers’ labour 
market histories play a key role in this context because they allow us to implement a design, 
which controls for certain potentially unobserved confounders. By considering a homogenous 
sample of firms initially not offering PWE and conditioning on 10 years of pre-treatment la-
bour market outcomes of the firms’ employees, time-constant unobserved factors that jointly 
affect the introduction of PWE and workers’ labour market outcomes are controlled for in a 
similar way as discussed in Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2011). Therefore, the CIA is more 
plausible than in conventional cross-sectional studies that do not make use of pre-treatment 
outcomes. As regards the latter, due to the requirement that all workers in our sample have 
been with the same firm for at least three years, our sample is extremely homogenous with 
respect to short- to medium-run employment histories. On top of that, we condition on 10 
years of employment, unemployment, and earning histories of the employees in a detailed 
way.  However, CIA still remains a strong assumption. Therefore, to assess its validity, we 
exploit that young workers, who are not eligible for PWE and are far from reaching eligibility, 
should be unaffected by the introduction of PWE. Estimating the effects for the youngest 
stratum (aged 31-40) serves as some sort of placebo test for the validity of the CIA. 
5.3 Estimation  
5.3.1 General methodology 
We use radius matching on the propensity score to estimate the average effects of the 
availability of PWE on employees’ labour market outcomes. Any estimator based on the CIA 
is built on the idea of comparing outcomes across units with and without treatment that are 
similar with respect to observed confounders in order to pin down the causal effect of the 
treatment. Propensity score matching estimators define similarity in terms of a function of the 
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probability to be treated conditional on the confounders. In the program evaluation literature, 
this conditional probability is referred to as propensity score (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). An advantage of these estimators is that they are semiparametric and therefore more 
robust than parametric methods, and that they allow for flexible effect heterogeneity.  
Specifically, we apply an estimator that takes into account the methodological consid-
erations of Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2011). Compared to standard nearest-neighbour 
matching this procedure is more precise because it incorporates the idea of radius matching 
(e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Furthermore, the algorithm uses the initial matching weights 
in a second step of (weighted) regression adjustment, which has two advantages. Firstly, the 
estimator satisfies a so-called double robustness property: the estimator remains consistent if 
either the matching step is based on a correctly specified selection model, or the regression 
model is correctly specified (e.g. Rubin, 1979, Joffe, Ten Have, Feldman, and Kimmel, 2004). 
Secondly, the regression adjustment should reduce small sample as well as asymptotic biases 
of matching (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013) investigate 
the finite sample properties of this radius matching with bias adjustment algorithm along with 
many other matching type estimators and find it to be highly competitive.  
Concerning inference, Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that for standard matching (i.e. 
based on a fixed number of comparison observations) bootstrap-based inference may be inva-
lid. However, the matching algorithm used in our analysis is smoother than the one studied by 
Abadie and Imbens (2008) because it is based on a variable number of comparisons and the 
regression adjustment. For this reason, the bootstrap is most likely a valid inference procedure 
in our context. However, the standard bootstrap, which randomly draws employees with re-
placement, may underestimate the standard errors, because there is a correlation of employees 
of the same establishment. Therefore, we rely on a block bootstrap that resamples establish-
ments (rather than individuals) along with all employees therein to account for clustering at 
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the establishment level. To be more precise, inference is based on (i) (block) bootstrapping 
establishments and individuals 499 times; (ii) computing the bootstrap t-statistics of the re-
spective average effects in each of the samples (normalized by the estimated effect); and (iii) 
estimating the p-value as the share of absolute bootstrap t-statistics that are larger than the 
absolute t-statistic in the original sample (see for instance MacKinnon, 2006, for a discussion 
on bootstrapping symmetric statistics). Since the theoretical results by Abadie and Imbens 
(2006) and the simulation based results in Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013a) suggest that 
the estimator is asymptotically normally distributed, bootstrapping the potentially pivotal t-
statistic (computed under the assumption that the weights obtained to compute the control 
group are non-stochastic; see Lechner, 2002) has the advantage of potentially providing so-
called asymptotic refinements and thus improving inference. In addition, we also checked the 
bootstrap distribution of the estimated effects directly (quantile method). The results are sim-
ilar (available on request). 
5.3.2 Results from the estimation of the propensity score  
We estimate the propensity score using separate probit models for each of the 12 strata 
(defined by age, gender, and region). This approach accounts flexibly for heterogeneity in the 
determinants of the decision to introduce PWE across stratum characteristics. This is im-
portant, because the distinct economic situation and workforce/industry composition in West 
and East Germany is likely to affect the inclination towards PWE. We condition on regional, 
firm level, and individual characteristics to control for the firm's selection into offering PWE 
and the staff's selection into the respective firms. The probit specifications are presented in 
Appendix A.7 The coefficients show that firm size (or variables based thereon), industry, 
organizational features (as recent reorganizations in the corporate structure or payment ori-
                                                          
7  The specifications are the result of the methodological issues discussed in the last section as well as extensive 
specification tests for normality, heteroscedasticity and in particular omitted variables. The data contain hun-
dreds of variables, a lot of them being highly correlated. We started with a parsimonious specification that 
included the main confounders that we identified from the literature and theoretical considerations. As a re-
sult of the omitted variables tests for all variables in the data, we occasionally added additional variables.  
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ented towards a collective agreement) and staff-related issues (hard to find skilled workers, 
staff shortage, high rate of absences) are crucial predictors. Among the individual characteris-
tics, labour market histories and job characteristics (skill level and occupation) are important 
covariates. Finally, regional characteristics (such as whether the firm is situated in an urban 
area) are related to the firm’s decision to offer PWE as well.  
5.3.3 Common support and covariate balancing  
Based on the estimated propensity scores we ensure overlap of the distributions in the 
treated and nontreated samples by excluding treated individuals with scores higher than the 
maximum among the nontreated and, similarly, nontreated individuals with scores lower than 
the minimum among the treated. Applying the matching technique outlined above on the 
common support results in good balancing of the covariate distributions in treated and un-
treated establishments. This holds not only for the variables directly entering the respective 
propensity score, but also for those variables not included, in particular the large number of 
pre-treatment outcomes.8 
6 Results 
This section presents the average effects of the availability of PWE on various indi-
vidual-level outcomes of the firms’ employees up to 6.5 years after treatment (in 2002). We 
start by investigating take-up of PWE among employees to assess whether it is used in any 
quantitatively important way such that effects can be expected. We then analyse various indi-
vidual labour market outcomes. It appears particularly interesting whether the availability of 
PWE raises the labour force attachment of elderly cohorts. Alternatively, the results in Ma-
chado and Portela (2012) suggest that the availability of PWE may accelerate (de facto) re-
tirement, e.g., by workers lowering their regular employment and increasing the likelihood of 
entering unemployment or withdrawing from the labour force. We therefore estimate the ef-
                                                          
8  Due to the very large number of tested variables, we abstain from presenting the results of the balancing tests. 
They are available on request. 
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fects on employment, unemployment, and time out of the labour force. We also look at earn-
ings to evaluate financial consequences for firms’ employees. Finally, we also investigate the 
effects on tenure, because one motivation for firms to offer PWE might be to retain elderly 
workers for longer than they would do otherwise. Furthermore, a firm that offers PWE might 
be considered a more attractive employer by all workers, which may lead to higher average 
tenure in treated firms. 
The effects on employees who are not eligible for PWE are interesting as well. On the 
one hand, as discussed in section 5.2, younger workers should be unaffected. Thus, if we find 
relevant effects for this group, this raises doubts about the validity of our main identifying 
assumption. On the other hand, medium-aged workers (41-50) are not too far away from 
reaching eligibility. The prospect of being able to benefit from PWE later in their life may, for 
example, increase incentives to stay employed with the same firm.  
The results presented hereafter refer to the average treatment effects (ATE) on the re-
spective full populations, i.e., on the total of employees both in firms offering and not offering 
PWE. It is worth noting that the average effects on the treated (i.e., on the employees actually 
working in establishments with PWE), which are available from the authors upon request, are 
in general comparable, however, considerably less precisely estimated. 
6.1 Take-up of PWE  
The first question of interest is to which extent PWE is actually utilized if available in 
a firm. Figure 6.1 plots the estimated average effects of PWE availability on the cumulative 
utilization of PWE measured in months over a time frame of 0.5 to 6.5 years after the treat-
ment period (2002), separately for strata consisting of elderly workers (aged 51-60 in 2000) 
and individuals of intermediate age (41-50 in 2000). PWE take-up is statistically significant 
on the 5% level for all elderly groups at any point in time, as indicated by the round dots in 
the lines indicating the effects. Furthermore, PWE take-up is generally higher in the East than 
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in the West and the differences are particularly large among females. The cumulative time in 
PWE is on average more than nine months for East German women after 6.5 years, but less 
than half a year for their West German counterparts. Nevertheless, PWE take-up is economi-
cally important among all elderly groups and, as expected, much higher than in the intermedi-
ate groups, where the oldest individuals only become eligible after several years. Accordingly, 
cumulated PWE only starts to rise after 3 years in the intermediate groups and becomes sta-
tistically significant for females in the West, although the magnitude of the effect remains 
small.  
Figure 6.1: ATE on cumulative PWE in months  
 
 
Note:  Round dots (triangles) indicate that the effects are significant on the 5% (10%) level. Inference is based 
on 499 block bootstrap replications. 
6.2 Labour market outcomes 
Before commenting on the results for potentially affected elderly workers, we discuss 
the effect for younger employees, for whom we expect no effects if CIA is valid. For none of 
the five outcome variables considered (employment in Figure 6.2, tenure in Table 6.1, earn-
ings in Figure 6.3, unemployment in Figure 6.4, time out of the labour force in Figure 6.5) we 
find any effects for younger workers in West Germany, as well as younger male employees in 
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East Germany. Hence, there is no indication for violation of the CIA for these groups. For 
younger females in East Germany, however, we do find significant effects for all outcomes, 
suggesting that the results for elderly females in East Germany might still be subject to some 
selection bias. The fact that the estimated effects are small in most cases suggests, though, 
that this bias is not very large. Still, the effects for East German women should be interpreted 
with some caution. 
Figure 6.2: ATE on cumulated regular employment in months  
 
 
Note:  Round dots (triangles) indicate that the effects are significant on the 5% (10%) level. Inference is based 
on 499 block bootstrap replications. 
As the main objective of PWE is to increase the labour market attachment of elderly 
workers and to retain them in the firm, we start by presenting the effects on cumulated regular 
employment in Figure 6.2 and on tenure in the original firm in Table 6.1. The latter refers to 
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the time with the firm after “treatment”, i.e. from July 2002 onwards. For elderly workers, we 
only find a statistically significant positive impact on cumulated regular employment and ten-
ure in East Germany (effects for western workers are positive as well but not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels). 51 to 60 year old East German men and women in firms that 
offer PWE accumulate, respectively, 7 and 6 more months of regular employment and stay 
7.5 and 10.5 more months with the firm, which originally employed them than workers in 
firms that did not offer PWE in 2002. Note that since the results for East German men and 
women are very similar and because of the comparably small size of the effect for younger 
women, it is unlikely – at least for cumulated employment –that all of the effect we see for 
East German women is due to selection bias. Thus, in East Germany PWE was indeed effec-
tive in increasing labour market attachment of elderly workers and retention rates.  
Table 6.1: ATE on tenure in the original establishment in days 
Region Gender  Age Effect P-value in % 
West Males 31-40 -91 72 
  
41-50 -147 56 
  
51-60 -40 82 
 
Females 31-40 -204 30 
  
41-50 10 96 
  
51-60 -1 99 
East Males 31-40 -101 40 
  
41-50 -106 41 
  
51-60 224 14 
 
Females 31-40 298* 7 
  
41-50 178 19 
  
51-60 320*** <1 
Note:  */*** indicates significance on the 10%/1% level. Inference is based on 499 block bootstrap replications. 
Tenure refers to the time with the establishment after treatment measured from July 2002. Tenure before 
that is a control variable. 
There is some evidence, though, that elderly workers, including West German ones, 
benefit in terms of higher earnings. Figure 6.3 shows the effects for elderly workers and they 
are positive in almost all cases. With a level of 15,000 EUR after 6.5 years, they are particu-
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larly large for men, although mostly insignificant at conventional levels. Note that at least 
parts of the earnings effects are driven by higher employment rates (earnings are coded as 
zero if the individual is not employed). Again, there are no effects for middle-aged workers. 
Figure 6.3: ATE on cumulated earnings from employment in EUR 
 
Note:  Round dots (triangles) indicate that the effects are significant on the 5% (10%) level. Inference is based 
on 499 block bootstrap replications. 
Another interesting policy question is whether the availability of PWE effectively re-
duces exits of elderly workers to unemployment. Grogger and Wunsch (2013), for example, 
show that, in response to particularly generous unemployment insurance payments for elderly 
workers in Germany, a notable share of elderly workers (voluntarily or involuntarily) exits the 
labour market via unemployment before early retirement options become available. PWE 
provides an alternative pathway for an early exit from the labour market, especially with the 
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block model. Our results in Figure 6.4 indeed suggest that elderly workers in firms that offer 
PWE accumulate fewer months of unemployment. After 6.5 years, the effects are most pro-
nounced among East German workers, with a reduction of more than 5 months, which is 
statistically significant on the 5% level. For West German workers the effects are somewhat 
smaller, but still economically important and mostly statistically significant on the 10% level. 
As before, we find no effects for workers aged 41-50.  
Figure 6.4: ATE on cumulated unemployment in months  
 
Note:  Round dots (triangles) indicate that the effects are significant on the 5% (10%) level. Inference is based 
on 499 block bootstrap replications. 
Finally, when considering the effects on cumulated time outside the labor force in Fig-
ure 6.5, there are few statistically significant effects and all of them are economically negligi-
ble. The absence of effects on the cumulated time spent out of the labor force suggests that 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5
elderly males West
elderly females West
elderly males East
elderly females East
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5
intermediate males West
indermediate females West
intermediate males East
intermediate females East
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5
young males West
young females West
young males East
young females East
27 
 
elderly workers in firms that offer PWE withdraw from the labour market at about the same 
time and rate as workers in firms without PWE. Thus, this result is contrary to Machado and 
Portela (2012) who find that a reduction in working hours is associated with earlier full re-
tirement.   
Figure 6.5: ATE on cumulated time out of the labour force in months 
 
Note:  Round dots (triangles) indicate that the effects are significant on the 5% (10%) level. Inference is based 
on 499 block bootstrap replications. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we assess the impact of firms introducing part-time work schemes for 
gradual withdrawal of elderly employees from the labour market on their employees’ labour 
market outcomes. In contrast to Machado and Portela (2012), we find that the time of com-
plete withdrawal from the labour market is unaffected. However, the availability of PWE is 
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beneficial in that it considerably reduces unemployment among elderly workers. The overall 
effects differ between East and West Germany, though. In West Germany, there are gains 
neither in terms of cumulated employment nor in terms of tenure in the firm. PWE only 
changes the pathway towards retirement. The time when elderly West German employees 
leave their jobs is unaffected by PWE. Rather than registering as unemployed and receiving 
unemployment insurance or social security payment after job exit, elderly employees exit via 
PWE by entering the non-employment phase of the block model. During this time, they re-
ceive payments from their employer. From the perspective of the social insurance system, this 
is desirable because unemployment insurance and social security payments are reduced.   
In East Germany, which is characterized by particularly difficult labour market condi-
tions, PWE is even more beneficial for employees. Positive effects on net cumulated em-
ployment indicate an increase in the labour market attachment of elderly workers in addition 
to reduced exits via unemployment. This results in higher tax revenues and higher social in-
surance contributions together with lower social insurance payouts. Moreover, firms offering 
PWE are able to retain their elderly employees longer compared to firms without PWE offers. 
Our results suggest that partial or gradual retirement options offered by firms are an 
important tool to alleviate the negative effects of low labour market attachment of elderly 
workers in ageing societies, especially when labour market conditions are difficult. Firms 
should thus be encouraged to offer such schemes.   
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Appendix A: Probit specifications for selection into PWE 
Table A1: Probit specifications for males in West Germany 
 
Aged 31-40 Aged 41-50 Aged 51 plus 
 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value  
in % 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value 
in % 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value  
in % 
Constant -6.984 0.0 -7.211 0.0 -5.948 0.0 
Firm characteristics 
      Log number of employees 0.792 0.0 0.966 0.0 0.902 0.0 
501-1000 employees -0.503 0.0 -0.818 0.0 -0.697 0.0 
Share of employees being 55 or older 2.203 0.0 1.323 0.4 0.233 67.1 
Share of employees leaving the firm -1.480 0.0 -1.403 0.0 -0.311 8.1 
Share of unskilled employees -0.387 0.1 -0.366 0.2 0.155 27.4 
Single branch firm 0.326 0.0 0.319 0.0 0.222 0.0 
High number of absences is a problem -0.426 0.0 -0.522 0.0 -0.705 0.0 
Staff shortage is problem -0.333 0.0 -0.266 0.0 -0.458 0.0 
No working-time accounts 0.000 99.3 0.192 0.0 0.310 0.0 
Reorganization of corporate structure 0.617 0.0 0.615 0.0 0.543 0.0 
Pay tied to collective agreement -0.751 0.0 -0.656 0.0 -0.739 0.0 
Manufacturing industry 0.439 0.0 0.508 0.0 0.564 0.0 
Employee characteristics 
      Age 0.006 49.0 0.001 85.0 0.001 89.1 
No German citizen 0.289 0.1 -0.111 18.3 -0.014 86.8 
University entrance degree (Abitur) -0.216 3.4 -0.272 0.2 -0.258 1.1 
No vocational degree 0.041 59.3 0.034 64.6 -0.019 82.7 
Manufacturing occupation 0.226 0.0 0.231 0.0 0.407 0.0 
Service occupation 0.153 3.8 0.025 70.9 0.138 3.5 
Unskilled worker 0.249 0.1 0.383 0.0 0.291 0.1 
Clerk 0.104 20.1 0.196 0.8 0.188 1.3 
Half-monthly earnings in EUR 1.060 0.0 0.923 0.0 0.414 0.1 
Half-monthly earnings > 1500 EUR -0.476 0.0 -0.388 0.0 -0.069 47.8 
Tenure 0.059 30.6 0.064 24.1 -0.007 92.3 
Tenure 7 years -0.192 12.9 -0.441 0.0 -0.428 0.8 
Regional characteristics 
      Big agglomeration -0.653 0.0 -0.629 0.0 -0.650 0.0 
Local unemployment rate 0.131 0.0 0.097 0.0 0.080 0.0 
Northern Germany -0.459 0.0 -0.345 0.2 -0.577 0.0 
Central Germany -0.150 0.8 -0.102 7.3 -0.146 3.1 
Number of individual observations 4098 
 
4269 
 
3390 
 Efron's R2 0.26 
 
0.28 
 
0.28 
 Note: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. 
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Table A2: Probit specifications for females in West Germany 
 
Aged 31-40 Aged 41-50 Aged 51 plus 
 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value  
in % 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value  
in % 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value  
in % 
Constant -4.917 0.0 -4.403 0.0 -4.070 0.0 
Firm characteristics 
      Log number of employees 0.795 0.0 0.678 0.0 0.694 0.0 
Share of employees being 55 or older -0.529 37.4 -0.165 75.5 -1.113 6.8 
Share of employees leaving the firm -0.291 39.5 -1.322 0.0 -0.318 33.9 
Share of unskilled employees -1.154 0.0 -0.711 0.0 -0.624 0.0 
Single branch firm 0.058 31.9 -0.058 30.8 -0.013 85.6 
High number of absences is a problem -0.335 0.0 -0.307 0.0 -0.129 10.7 
Staff shortage is problem -0.645 0.0 -0.684 0.0 -0.668 0.0 
No working-time accounts 0.050 43.7 -0.109 8.5 -0.241 0.2 
Reorganization of corporate structure 0.709 0.0 0.572 0.0 0.298 0.0 
Pay tied to collective agreement -0.677 0.0 -0.454 0.0 -0.386 0.0 
Trade sector -0.281 1.0 -0.015 88.3 0.211 11.0 
Service sector -0.544 0.0 -0.177 4.4 -0.427 0.0 
Employee characteristics 
      Age -0.003 73.1 -0.017 4.5 -0.022 5.4 
No German citizen 0.298 0.4 0.324 0.0 0.367 0.1 
No vocational degree -0.049 48.6 0.043 50.2 0.040 59.0 
Manufacturing, technical, construction 
occupation -0.399 0.0 -0.205 2.7 -0.068 55.6 
Low-skilled service occupation -0.516 0.0 -0.370 0.0 0.002 98.2 
Other occupation -0.030 74.8 0.076 38.0 0.143 15.6 
Part-time worker 0.515 0.0 0.535 0.0 0.531 0.0 
Half-monthly earnings in EUR 0.400 0.0 0.811 0.0 0.751 0.0 
Half-monthly earnings > 1500 EUR -0.330 0.2 -0.369 0.1 0.043 78.7 
Tenure 0.203 0.1 0.305 0.0 0.251 0.1 
Tenure 7 years -0.122 24.1 -0.248 2.5 -0.370 1.7 
Out of the labour force in last 4 years -0.067 33.7 0.041 60.1 0.119 23.8 
Out of the labour force in last 10 years 0.107 9.9 -0.020 75.3 0.001 98.6 
Regional characteristics 
      Big agglomeration -0.454 0.0 -0.462 0.0 -0.421 0.0 
Local unemployment rate 0.089 0.0 0.112 0.0 0.122 0.0 
Northern Germany 
  
-0.511 0.0 -0.806 0.0 
Central Germany -0.235 0.0 -0.400 0.0 -0.286 0.0 
Number of individual observations 3323 
 
3412 
 
2227 
 Efron's R2 0.32 
 
0.31 
 
0.30 
 Note: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. 
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Table A3: Probit specifications for males in East Germany 
 
Aged 31-40 Aged 41-50 Aged 51 plus 
 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value 
in % 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value 
in % 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value 
in % 
Constant -3.275 0.0 -1.277 0.7 -2.279 0.1 
Firm characteristics 
      Log number of employees 0.155 0.1 0.029 51.9 0.138 1.1 
Share of employees with university or 
college degree 4.167 0.0 4.554 0.0 3.019 0.0 
Share of employees being 55 or older -0.670 13.0 0.033 93.7 1.946 0.0 
No working-time accounts 0.178 0.4 0.280 0.0 0.065 45.5 
Share of employees leaving the firm 
(survey) -7.419 0.0 -9.973 0.0 -10.950 0.0 
No reorganization 0.002 97.7 -0.035 59.8 -0.307 0.0 
Looking for staff in future 0.833 0.0 1.071 0.0 1.047 0.0 
Hiring skilled workers is problem 0.365 0.0 0.157 0.9 0.164 3.6 
Hiring young workers is problem -0.525 0.0 -0.472 0.0 -0.863 0.0 
High number of absences is a problem 0.671 0.0 0.681 0.0 0.560 0.0 
Foreign-owned to more than 50% -0.491 0.0 -0.551 0.0 -0.930 0.0 
Trade sector 0.964 0.0 1.097 0.0 0.767 0.0 
Service sector -0.531 0.0 -0.518 0.0 -0.633 0.0 
Employee characteristics 
      Age -0.003 71.0 -0.027 0.1 -0.009 37.7 
University entrance degree (Abitur) -0.121 48.1 -0.169 21.1 0.232 22.1 
Vocational degree 0.392 0.0 0.139 14.5 0.136 25.3 
University or college degree 0.427 4.8 0.312 6.3 -0.099 68.1 
Technical occupation -0.453 0.0 -0.382 0.0 -0.142 8.8 
Higher-skilled service occupation -0.602 0.0 -0.578 0.0 -0.343 0.1 
Low-skilled service occupation 0.075 44.7 -0.135 13.6 -0.084 45.0 
Other occupation -0.403 0.0 -0.451 0.0 -0.361 0.3 
Skilled worker -0.378 0.0 -0.301 0.0 -0.116 22.3 
Clerk -0.284 0.8 -0.360 0.1 -0.261 4.9 
Half-monthly earnings in EUR 1.118 0.0 1.562 0.0 0.265 20.6 
Half-monthly earnings > 1500 EUR -0.209 8.8 -0.415 0.0 -0.037 76.1 
Cumulated earnings from employment in 
last 10 years -0.131 25.4 -0.298 2.3 0.105 40.7 
Tenure 0.517 0.0 0.523 0.0 0.530 0.0 
Tenure 7 years -0.713 0.0 -0.854 0.0 -0.766 0.0 
Unemployed in last 4 years -0.344 1.0 -0.645 0.0 -0.583 2.6 
Unemployed in last 10 years -0.085 19.5 -0.203 0.2 -0.004 96.8 
Out of the labour force in last 4 years -0.021 82.4 -0.026 77.4 -0.002 98.8 
Out of the labour force in last 10 years 0.320 0.0 0.177 0.1 0.113 10.9 
Fraction employed 9-10 years before 1.015 0.0 1.014 0.0 1.257 0.0 
Regional characteristics 
      Rural area 0.271 0.0 0.395 0.0 0.390 0.0 
Number of individual observations 4145 
 
4894 
 
2902 
 Efron's R2 0.33 
 
0.36 
 
0.36 
 Note: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. 
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Table A4: Probit specifications for females in East Germany  
 
Aged 31-40 Aged 41-50 Aged 51 plus 
 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value 
in % 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value 
in % 
Coeffi-
cient 
P-value 
in % 
Constant -2.446 0.0 -2.837 0.0 -3.348 0.0 
Firm characteristics 
      Log number of employees 0.388 0.0 0.373 0.0 0.438 0.0 
Share of employees with university or 
college degree 2.391 0.0 3.184 0.0 
  Share of employees being 55 or older -5.083 0.0 -4.374 0.0 -3.967 0.0 
No working-time accounts 0.007 89.1 0.368 0.0 0.177 0.8 
Hiring skilled workers is problem 0.835 0.0 0.622 0.0 0.611 0.0 
Share of employees leaving the firm 
(survey) -2.745 0.0 -2.971 0.0 -3.044 0.0 
No reorganization -0.061 19.7 0.152 0.0 0.181 0.4 
Currently looking for staff 0.045 37.2 -0.061 19.6 0.112 8.1 
Share of female employees -0.615 0.0 -0.065 50.8 -0.238 10.9 
Pay tied to collective agreement -0.301 0.0 -0.274 0.0 -0.103 21.1 
Trade sector 0.915 0.0 
  
-0.009 91.3 
Service sector 0.807 0.0 
    Employee characteristics 
      Age -0.020 1.3 -0.009 19.3 0.007 49.1 
No vocational degree 0.219 6.6 0.330 0.1 0.133 29.7 
University or college degree -0.093 45.2 -0.277 0.1 -0.071 58.4 
Manufacturing, technical, construction 
occupation -0.172 12.3 -0.229 0.9 -0.149 28.2 
Low-skilled service occupation -0.259 0.1 -0.042 52.2 -0.079 42.3 
Other occupation -0.688 0.0 -0.594 0.0 -0.740 0.0 
Skilled worker -0.108 28.2 0.175 3.5 0.307 2.2 
Clerk -0.541 0.0 -0.211 2.1 -0.154 27.7 
Part-time worker -0.283 2.5 0.317 0.0 0.301 3.3 
Half-monthly earnings in EUR 1.203 0.0 1.073 0.0 0.987 0.0 
Half-monthly earnings > 1500 EUR -0.551 0.0 -0.616 0.0 -0.657 0.0 
Tenure 0.172 2.3 0.043 57.6 -0.126 27.2 
Tenure 7 years -0.254 1.1 -0.042 68.6 0.159 32.3 
Unemployed in last 4 years -0.056 63.3 0.035 73.8 -0.079 65.4 
Unemployed in last 10 years -0.070 25.4 -0.189 0.0 -0.205 1.0 
Out of the labour force in last 2 years 0.021 86.1 0.283 3.0 0.253 15.8 
Out of the labour force in last 4 years 0.008 94.3 -0.105 36.1 -0.140 43.6 
Out of the labour force in last 10 years -0.001 99.2 0.012 80.7 -0.134 5.2 
Fraction employed 9-10 years before 0.050 66.4 0.399 0.0 0.459 0.5 
Fraction part-time employed in last 10 
years 0.337 1.8 
    Employment ended due to health problems 
in past 10 years 0.136 7.1 -0.072 37.5 -0.008 94.3 
Regional characteristics 
      Rural area 0.290 0.0 0.134 0.3 0.170 1.2 
Number of individual observations 4339 
 
4953 
 
2454 
 Efron's R2 0.33 
 
0.27 
 
0.24 
 Note: All variables are measured in 2000 or relative to June 30, 2000. 
